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t is a great honor to pay tribute here to one of the most influential papers written
in the field of international economics since World War II. Rudiger Dornbusch's
masterpiece, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics" was published 25
years ago in the Journal of Political Economy, in 1976. The "overshooting" paper,
as everyone calls it, marks the birth of modern international macroeconomics.
There is little question that Dornbusch's rational expectations reformulation of the
Mundell-Fleming model extended the latter's life for another 25 years, keeping it
in the forefront of practical policy analysis.
This lecture is divided into three parts. First, I will try to convey to the reader
a sense of why "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics" has been so influen-
tial. My goal here is not so much to offer a comprehensive literature survey,
though of course there has to be some of that. Rather, I hope the reader will gain
an appreciation of the paper's enormous stature in the field and why so much
excitement has always surrounded it. To that end, I have also included some mate-
rial on life in Dornbusch's MIT classroom. The second part of the lecture is a more
detached discussion of the empirical evidence for and against the model, and a
thumbnail sketch of the model itself. The final section touches on competing
notions of overshooting.
*Kenneth Rogoff is Economic Counselor and Director of the Research Department at the
International Monetary Fund. The author would like to acknowledge helpful comments from Maurice
Obstfeld, Robert Flood, Eduardo Borensztein, and Carmen Reinhart, and research assistance from
Priyadarshani Joshi, Kenichiro Kashiwase, and Rafael Romeu.Kenneth Rogoff
The Overshooting Model Perspective
One of the first words that comes to mind in describing Dornbusch's overshooting
paper is "elegant." Policy economists are understandably cynical about
academics' preoccupation with theoretical elegance. But Dornbusch's work is a
perfect illustration of why the search for abstract beauty can sometimes yield a
large practical payoff. It is precisely the beauty and clarity of Dornbusch's anal-
ysis that has made it so flexible and useful. Like great literature, Dornbusch
(1976a) can be appreciated at many levels. Policymakers can appreciate its
insights without reference to extensive mathematics; graduate students and
advanced researchers found within it a rich lode of subtleties.
A second word to describe the work is "path breaking" I will offer some quan-
titative evidence later, but suffice to say here that literally scores of Ph.D. theses
(including my own) have built upon Dornbusch (1976a). It is not hyperbole to say
that Dornbusch's new view of floating exchange rates reinvigorated a field that was
on its way to becoming moribund, using only dated, discredited models and methods.
Dornbusch (1976a) inspired fresh thinking and brought fresh faces into the field. In
preparing this lecture, I re-read Maurice Obstfeld's superb inaugural Mundell-
Fleming lecture from last year (IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 47, 2001). Obstfeld (2001)
spans the whole modern history of international macroeconomics, from Meade to
"New Open Economy Macroeconomics," but the main emphasis is on Bob Mundell's
papers. I, and perhaps many other readers, found Obstfeld's discussion enlightening
in part because we do not have the same intimate knowledge of Mundell's papers that
we do of Dornbusch (1976a). Mundell's profoundly original ideas are, of course, at
the core of many things we do in modern international finance, and he was the teacher
of many important figures in the field including Michael Mussa, Jacob Frenkel, and
Rudiger Dornbusch. Mundell is a creative giant who was thinking about a single
currency in Europe back when intergalactic trade seemed like a more realistic topic
for research. But the methods and models in Mundell's papers are now badly dated,
and are not always easy to digest for today's reader (even if at the time they seemed
a picture of clarity compared to the existing state of the art (Meade, 1951)). One of
the remarkable features of Dornbusch's paper is that today's graduate students can
still easily read it in the original and, as I will document, many still do.
The reader should understand that as novel as the overshooting model was,
Dornbusch was hardly writing in a vacuum. Jo Anna Gray (1976), Stanley Fischer
(1977), and Ned Phelps and John Taylor (1977) were all working on closed
economy, sticky-price, rational expectations models at around the same time.
Stanley Black (1973) had already introduced rational expectations to international
macroeconomics. Dornbusch's Chicago classmate Michael Mussa (my prede-
cessor as Economic Counselor at the IMF) was also working actively in the area
at the time, though he delayed publication of his main piece on the topic until
Mussa (1982). There were others who were fishing in the same waters as
Dornbusch at around the same time (e.g., Hans Genberg and Henryk Kierzkowski,
1979). But the elegance and clarity of Dornbusch's model and its obvious and
immediate policy relevance puts his paper in a separate class from the other inter-
national macroeconomics papers of its time.DORNBUSCH'S OVERSHOOTING MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
Still a Useful Policy Tool
A word about New Open Economy Macroeconomics, which Obstfeld surveyed
last year; certainly this literature has come to dominate the academic literature on
international macroeconomic policy.1 Superficially, of course, most of the newer
generation models appear quite different from Dornbusch's model, not least
because they introduce rigorous microfoundations for consumer and investor
behavior. At the same time, however, they can be viewed as direct descendants.
Formally, New Open Economy Macroeconomics attempts to marry the empirical
sensibility of the sticky-price Dornbusch model with the elegant but unrealistic
"intertemporal approach to the current account."
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But even with the inevitable onslaught of more modern approaches, the
Dornbusch model is still very much alive today on its own, precisely because it is
so clear, simple, and elegant. Let's be honest. If one is in a pinch and needs a quick
response to a question about how monetary policy might affect the exchange rate,
most of us will still want to check any answer against Dornbusch's model.
Dornbusch's variant of the Mundell-Fleming paper is not just about over-
shooting. The general approach has been applied to a host of different problems,
including "Dutch disease," choice of exchange rate regime, commodity price
volatility, and analyses of disinflation in developing countries. It is a framework
for thinking about international monetary policy, not simply a model for under-
standing exchange rates. But what sold the paper to policymakers, what still sells
the paper to graduate students, is overshooting. One has to realize that at the time
Dornbusch was writing, the world had just made the transition from fixed to flex-
ible exchange rates, and no one really understood what was going on. Contrary to
Friedman's (1953) rosy depiction of life under floating, exchange rate changes did
not turn out to smoothly mirror international inflation differentials. Instead, they
were an order of magnitude more volatile, far more volatile than most experts had
guessed they would be. Along comes Dornbusch who lays out an incredibly
simple theory that showed how, with sticky prices, instability in monetary
policy—and monetary policy was particularly unstable during the mid-1970s—
could be the culprit, and to a far greater degree than anyone had imagined.
Dornbusch's explanation shocked and delighted researchers because he showed
how overshooting did not necessarily grow out of myopia or herd behavior in
markets. Rather, exchange rate volatility was needed to temporarily equilibrate the
system in response to monetary shocks, because underlying national prices adjust
so slowly. It was this idea that took the paper from being a mere "A" to an "A++."
As we shall see, Dornbusch's conjecture about why exchange rates overshoot has
proven of relatively limited value empirically, although a plausible case can be
1See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a, 1996, 2000) and Brian Doyle's New Open Economy
Macroeconomics homepage, http://www.geocities.com/brian_m_doyle/open.html.
2The intertemporal approach reached its pinnacle with the publication of Jacob Frenkel and Assaf
Razin (1987), completed just after Frenkel's arrival as Economic Counselor at the IMF. As I shall high-
light in Section III, the main empirical failing of the intertemporal approach is that it imposed fully flex-
ible prices and wages, an assumption which seems patently at odds with the data.Kenneth Rogoff
made that it captures the effects of major turning points in monetary policy. But
the true strength of the model lies in that it highlights how, in today's modern
economies, one needs to think about the interaction of sluggishly adjusting goods
markets and hyperactive asset markets. This broader insight certainly still lies at
the core of modern thinking about exchange rates, even if the details of our models
today differ quite a bit.
Paul Samuelson once remarked that there are very few ideas in economics that
are both (a) true and (b) not obvious. Dornbusch's overshooting paper is certainly
one of those rare ideas. Now, of course, unless one is steeped in recent economic
theory, little of what appears in today's professional economics journals will seem
obvious. However, that is only because it takes constant training and retooling to
be able to follow the assumptions in the latest papers. Once you can understand
the assumptions, what follows is usually not so surprising. But this is certainly not
the case with the "overshooting" result, as I will now briefly illustrate.
Overshooting: The Basic Idea
Since this lecture is aimed at a broad audience, it is not my intention to invoke too
many mathematical formulas, though there will be a few. A small number of equa-
tions is necessary if only to impress upon the reader how simple the concept really
is. The reader can easily skip over them.
Two relationships lie at the heart of the overshooting result. The first, equation
(1) below, is the "uncovered interest parity" condition. It says that the home
interest rate on bonds, i, must equal the foreign interest rate i*, plus the expected
rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, Et (et+1 - et), where e is the logarithm of the exchange rate (home currency price of foreign currency)
3, and Et denotes
market expectations based on time t information. That is, if home and foreign
bonds are perfect substitutes, and international capital is fully mobile, the two
bonds can only pay different interest rates if agents expect there will be compen-
sating movement in the exchange rate. Throughout, we will assume that the home
country is small in world capital markets, so that we may take the foreign interest
rate i* as exogenous.
4
3When I first took Rudi's course at MIT in 1977, I had never before studied international finance. Not
being socialized in the field, I found it quite odd that a depreciation of the home exchange rate should be
described as a rise in e, rather than a fall, which seems more natural. This is, of course, the convention in
the theory of international finance, and it is one I have always felt awkward about passing on to my own
students at Harvard and Princeton. It is only now, having just arrived as Economic Counselor at the
International Monetary Fund, that I have come to appreciate the wisdom of the standard convention.
Already, on more than one occasion I have been involved in meetings on crisis countries in which the area
department director has exclaimed, "The exchange rate is completely collapsing!," and then pointed his
finger upward at the ceiling. It makes me ever the more grateful for Rudi's training.
4Equation (1) is commonplace these days, but remember that Mundell's (1963) model had i = i*, since
the technology for dealing with expectations had not yet been developed at the time of his writing.DORNBUSCH'S OVERSHOOTING MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
Uncovered interest rate parity
it+1 = i* + Et(et+1-et). (1)
t t
nominal expected rate
interest of change of
rate exchange rate
Indeed, Dornbusch assumed "perfect foresight" in his model—essentially that
there was no uncertainty—since techniques for incorporating uncertainty were not
yet fully developed at the time of his writing; the distinction between perfect fore-
sight and rational expectations is not consequential for our analysis here. Does
uncovered interest parity really hold in practice? Many a paper has been written
on the topic, and the short answer is no, not exactly. Several recent attempts to
reconcile exchange rate theory and data turn on generalizing this equation, though
it remains to be proven how fruitful this approach will be.
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The second core equation of the Dornbusch model is the money demand equation
Money demand




where m is the money supply, p is the domestic price level, and y is domestic
output, all in logarithms; n and cp are positive parameters. Higher interest rates
raise the opportunity cost of holding money, and thereby lower the demand for
money. Conversely, an increase in output raises the transactions demand for
money. Finally, the demand for money is proportional to the price level. Equation
(2) is a simple variant of the Goldfeld (1973) money demand function. Given the
enormous revolution in transactions technologies, there has been a rethinking of
money demand functions in recent years, but not in any direction that requires us
to completely redo Dornbusch's setup.
So how does "overshooting" work? It can all be captured by combining equa-
tions (1) and (2) with a few simple assumptions. First, assume that the domestic
price level p does not move instantaneously in response to unanticipated monetary
disturbances, but adjusts only slowly over time. We shall say more about this
assumption shortly, but it is certainly empirically realistic. As Mussa (1986) so
convincingly demonstrated, domestic price levels generally have the cardiogram
5See especially, the interesting attempt by Devereux and Engel (2002) to reconcile their "New Open
Economy Macroeconomics" paper with the data, forthcoming in a Carnegie Rochester conference volume
devoted to the topic. (See also, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2002, who show how the risk premium can poten-
tially be quite large in empirical exchange rate equations.)Kenneth Rogoff
of a rock compared to floating exchange rates, at least in countries with trend
inflation below, say, 100-200 percent per annum. Second, assume that output y is
exogenous (what really matters is that it, too, moves sluggishly in response to
monetary shocks). Third, we will assume that money is neutral in the long run, so
that a permanent rise in m leads to a proportionate rise in e and p in the long run.
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Now suppose, following Dornbusch's famous thought experiment, that there
is an unanticipated permanent increase in the money supply m. If the nominal
money supply rises but the price level is temporarily fixed, then the supply of real
balances m-p must rise as well. To equilibrate the system, the demand for real
balances must rise. Since output y is assumed fixed in the short run, the only way
that the demand for real balances can go up is if the interest rate i on domestic
currency bonds falls. According to equation (1), it is possible for i to fall if and
only if, over the future life of the bond contract, the home currency is expected to
appreciate. But how is this possible if we know that the long-run impact of the
money supply shock must be a proportionate depreciation in the exchange rate?
Dornbusch's brilliant answer is that the initial depreciation of the exchange rate
must, on impact, be larger than the long-run depreciation. This initial excess
depreciation leaves room for the ensuing appreciation needed to simultaneously
clear the bond and money markets. The exchange rate must overshoot. Note that
this whole result is driven by the assumed rigidity of domestic prices p. Otherwise,
as the reader may check, e, p, and m would all move proportionately on impact,
and there would be no overshooting. Put differently, money is neutral here if all
nominal quantities, including the price level, are fully flexible.
Of course, I have left out a lot of details, and we need to check them to make
sure that this story is complete and hangs together. We will do it later.
Fundamentally, however, the power and generality of the overshooting idea
derives precisely from the fact that it can be cooked with so few ingredients. The
only equations we need are (1) and (2), and therefore the result is going to obtain
across a broad class of models that incorporate sticky prices.
Now, underlying Dornbusch's disarmingly simple result lies some truly
radical thinking. At the time Rudi was working on his paper, the concept of sticky
prices was under severe attack. In his elegant formalization of the Phelps islands
model, Lucas (1973) suggested that one could understand the real effects of mone-
tary policy without any appeal to Keynesian nominal rigidities, and by 1975,
Lucas had many influential followers in Sargent, Barro, and others. The Chicago-
Minnesota School maintained that sticky prices were nonsense and continued to
advance this view for at least another fifteen years. It was the dominant view in
academic macroeconomics. Certainly, there was a long period in which the
assumption of sticky prices was a recipe for instant rejection at many leading jour-
nals. Despite the religious conviction among macroeconomic theorists that prices
cannot be sticky, the Dornbusch model remained compelling to most practical
6The property of long-run monetary neutrality is not quite as innocuous or general as it seems. As
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a, 1996) stressed, if a monetary shock leads to current account imbalances, the
ensuing wealth shifts can have long lasting real effects far beyond the length of fixity in any nominal
contracts. In this context, however, this effect turns out to be of secondary importance.DORNBUSCH'S OVERSHOOTING MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
international macroeconomists. This divergence of views led to a long rift between
macroeconomics and much of mainstream international finance. Of course, today,
the pendulum has swung back entirely, and there is a broad consensus across
schools of thought that some form of price rigidity is absolutely necessary to
explain real-world data in either closed or open economies. The new view can be
found in many places, but certainly in the closed economy work of authors such
as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2002), and of course in New
Open Economy Macroeconomics. The Phelps-Lucas islands paradigm for mone-
tary policy is, for now, a footnote (albeit a very clever one) in the history of mone-
tary theory.
There are more than a few of us in my generation of international economists
who still bear the scars of not being able to publish sticky-price papers during the
years of new neoclassical repression. I still remember a mid-1980s breakfast with
a talented young macroeconomic theorist from Barcelona, who was of the
Chicago-Minnesota school. He was a firm believer in the flexible-price Lucas
islands model, and spent much of the meal ranting and raving about the inade-
quacies of the Dornbusch model: "What garbage! Who still writes down models
with sticky prices and wages! There are no microfoundations. Why do interna-
tional economists think that such a model could have any practical relevance? It's
just ridiculous!" Eventually the conversation turns and I ask, "So, how are you
doing in recruiting? Your university has made a lot of changes." The theorist
responds without hesitation: "Oh, it's very hard for Spanish universities to recruit
from the rest of the world right now. With the recent depreciation of the exchange
rate, our salaries [that remained fixed in nominal terms] have become totally
uncompetitive." Such was life.
Cite Counts and Course Reading Lists
Since we are here to focus on the innate beauty of the Dornbusch model, it is
perhaps crass to list citation counts and other quantitative measures of influence.
In principle, however, economics is a quantitative science, so please forgive me for
doing so. For the period 1976-2001, the social science citation index (of major
economics journals) shows 917 published articles citing Dornbusch (1976). This
includes 42 separate articles in Staff Papers. Roughly 40 percent of the issues of
Staff Papers published between 1977 and 2001 included at least one article citing
the Dornbusch model; the IMF should have given him a column. This is influence!
Oh, yes, as an afterthought, I should note that Dornbusch's article has also been
cited in 40 different articles in the American Economic Review and the Journal of
Political Economy, the leading professional economics journals. To put these
numbers in perspective, the reader should understand that for the typical middle-
aged scholar at a top-five American university, 500 lifetime citations is not a bad
count for all of one's articles, much less a single one. Figure 1—which at first
glance looks like the hill program on a "stairmaster" exercise machine—gives the
time trajectory of citations for Dornbusch's article. The article's peak citation
years were 1984-86, when it received over 50 citations per year. Not bad for an
article ten years after being written. Even towards the end of the 1990s DornbuschKenneth Rogoff
(1976a) was still getting over 25 citations per year. And remember, these figures
only include journal articles, not books and conferences.
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Another measure of influence is inclusion on reading lists for advanced grad-
uate courses in international finance. In 1990, Alan Deardorf performed an
informal survey of international finance reading lists at leading graduate
programs. To his surprise, only one article was listed on more than half of the
reading lists, and this particular article was listed on every single one. Guess which
article it was? Today, since virtually every course reading list is posted on the web,
conducting such a survey is much easier. Table 1 lists the top-ranked international
economics Ph.D. programs according to U.S. News and World Report. Also listed
are the top ranking international finance business programs. One finds that
Dornbusch's article is listed on virtually every course reading list, with the only
exception being a few cases where only Chapter 9 of Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996)—which contains an exposition of the Dornbusch model—is listed. Clearly
the Dornbusch article's influence in teaching is still alive and well as we mark its
twenty-fifth anniversary.
The broad concept of overshooting has taken on a life far beyond the academic
sphere. One can find the idea of exchange rate overshooting regularly invoked in
the pages of the financial press and in the speeches of major policy leaders. During
1999-2000, the Economist magazine contained 14 articles including the terms
"overshooting" and "exchange rates." During 2001, the Financial Times had 11
references to overshooting. In recent months, both Federal Reserve Chairman,
Alan Greenspan (June 2001), and Bank of France President, Jean-Claude Trichet
(May 2001), have discussed overshooting in speeches, and one can find countless
more references by other world financial leaders, not least in developing countries.
This, too, is influence.
Learning from the Master: Life at MIT in Dornbusch's International
Finance Course
Before proceeding to more analytic material, it is perhaps helpful to say a bit about
how this author first learned the Dornbusch model. This will also give the reader
a bit of the flavor of the period. I sat in on Rudi's course in the spring of 1977.
("Spring," anyway, is the euphemism that MIT uses for the semester that starts in
February.) Dornbusch's classes during the three years 1976-78 included many
MIT students who went on to become luminaries in the field. A short list would
include Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Frankel, and Maurice Obstfeld, but there are liter-
ally scores of others who went on to distinguished academic careers. There were
several future finance ministers and heads of central banks as well. My 1977 class
happened to include the brilliant and charming Eliana Cardoso, whom Dornbusch
later married. Sitting beside the MIT students, there were also many Ph.D.
7One frame of reference is a comparison with citations to the celebrated Ricardian trade model of
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), which has been enormously influential across a broad range
of trade issues, and has become a workhorse model in the field. Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Kenneth RogoffDORNBUSCH'S OVERSHOOTING MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
students from Harvard, who braved the Cambridge winter to study at the master's
knee. These included Larry Summers and Jeffrey Sachs. Rudi has what can only
be described as a confrontational style of teaching, challenging his class with a
mix of incredibly difficult questions. To make things even more challenging, his
class typically met very early in the morning, far earlier than the typical graduate
student is accustomed to rising. To put himself at further advantage, as if he
needed it, Dornbusch has a habit of writing down graphs without labeling the axes,
a technique he learned from his own teacher, Robert Mundell. I guess if I had
really understood what was going on back then, it would have been easy to follow
which way the curves were supposed to shift. More often than not, however, I had
to go back after class and recheck the article he was supposed to be teaching—if
it had been written yet. At least I was not alone in being unable to answer so many
of the questions. Having witnessed Rudi engage the likes of young Larry
Summers, Paul Krugman, and Jeffrey Sachs, I would venture that Dornbusch's
international finance course at MIT is the answer to the trivia question, "When was
the last time these guys were completely humiliated in public?"
The day when Dornbusch presented his 1976 overshooting paper was different.
All the graphs were labeled that day and he seemed to have organized notes, not that
he drew on them much. The excitement in the room was palpable, as the logic behind
overshooting unfolded. You could see in the students' faces that something special
was happening. The ideas in Dornbusch (1976a) have inspired countless students to
choose international economics as a field. This author is certainly among them.
Theory and Empirics
The Data
We have come to praise the overshooting model, not to bury it, but it is time for a
few hard facts about the data. Now, if there is a consensus result in the empirical
literature, it has to be that nothing, but nothing, can systematically explain
exchange rates between major currencies with flexible exchange rates. This point
was first stated in such radical form by Meese and Rogoff (1983), and it very much
still stands today.
8 The basic problem with the Dornbusch model is that whereas it
seems to capture major turning points in monetary policy quite well (e.g., the
Volcker deflation of the early 1980s in the United States and the Thatcher defla-
tion of the late 1970s in Britain), the model does not seem to capture all the other
big exchange rate swings that regularly take place.
Formally testing the Dornbusch model is easier said than done. To take the
model to the data, one needs to resolve many issues. These include, not least, how
to allow for more general types of monetary disturbances, for the endogeneity
8See Rogoff (2001). In their chapter for the 1995 Handbook of International Economics, Frankel and
Rose observe that scores of attempts to reverse the Meese-Rogoff finding had only served to reinforce it.
More recent work can be found in papers presented at the September 2001 Conference on Empirical
Exchange Rate Modeling, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~cengel/ExchangeRateConference/exrate.htm.
The proceedings are published in the February 2003 Journal of International Economics.Kenneth Rogoff
of the money supply and interest rates, for real shocks, etc. Perhaps the most
robust empirical prediction of the model is Jeffrey Frankel's (1979) observation
that, under a reasonably general set of assumptions—which include that mone-
tary shocks must be a predominant source of disturbances—a generalized
Dornbusch model predicts that the real exchange rate and the real interest differ-
ential will be positively correlated. That is, high real interest rates will bid up the
real exchange rate. Frankel's generalization is an important one since if a rise in
the money supply signals high future inflation, it will have very different effects
on long-term nominal interest rates than if the rise in the money supply is
viewed as a temporary easing. Focusing on real interest rates turns out to finesse
this problem.
Figure 2a gives a graph of the U.S. dollar rate versus the deutsche mark. (For
future generations reading this lecture, I will note that the mark was Germany's
currency before the euro.) The solid line gives the real exchange rate, and the
dashed line is the one-year real interest differential.
9 A rise in the real exchange
rate represents a depreciation of the mark, and a rise in the real interest differen-
tial represents a rise in German real interest rates relative to those prevailing in the
United States. As one can see, the model does seem to say something about major
turning points, though we will not press to see if it robustly passes regression
tests.
1
0 Figure 2b for the Japanese yen versus the dollar tells a similar story. Even
this tenuous relationship between real exchange rates and the real interest differ-
ential we see in Figures 2a and 2b is not universal. Figure 2c gives the pound ster-
ling against the U.S. dollar; the relationship between the two series, if there is one,
hardly jumps off the page.
Another piece of evidence comes from looking at the comovements of
forward and spot exchange rates, as Robert Flood highlighted in his 1981
Carnegie-Rochester paper. Flood's basic point is that, in most cases, the over-
shooting model predicts that forward rates and spot rates will not, in general, move
one for one. The exact comovement depends on the nature of the shock (real
versus nominal, temporary versus permanent) and on the horizon of the forward
rate. In Dornbusch's thought experiment of a one-time unanticipated change in the
level of the money supply, the spot rate should move by more than the forward rate
at any horizon. This excess movement is precisely the overshooting. Figure 3a
graphs movements of the spot rate together with 90-day and one-year forward
rates for the yen/dollar exchange rate. Movements in the three series are almost
indistinguishable. The same observation holds for Figure 3b, which gives the
mark/dollar exchange rate. Now, if we were to magnify these graphs, a bit more
daylight would appear between the curves. Indeed, as Table 2 illustrates, forward
rate volatility is slightly lower than spot rate volatility over the sample period.
Though it would be straightforward, I do not actually test to see whether the differ-
ences are statistically significant. The overarching point is that the differences are
9The real interest rate is formed by taking the one-year nominal interest rate and subtracting off
lagged twelve-month inflation.
10Meese and Rogoff (1988) find that it is very difficult to detect any reliable relationship between real
interest rates and real exchange rates for the major currencies.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Variance of the Forward Rate (Aft)





















Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF staff.
Note: The calculations are based on the period from the first quarter 1979 through the fourth
quarter 2000.
small. Figures 3a and 3b may not constitute decisive evidence against over-
shooting, but neither does it give strong support to the concept.11
Does the empirical failure of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model mean
that we have to reject it as a useful tool for policy analysis? Not at all. First,
although the overshooting concept beautifully illustrates the inner workings of the
model, the broader usefulness of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model goes
well beyond the overshooting prediction. It is a generalized framework for
thinking about international macroeconomic policy. Second, as we shall see in the
next section, the model does not necessarily predict overshooting when output is
endogenous. Third, in newer models consumption typically appears in place of
output in the money demand equations; this change also tilts the balance away
from overshooting.
Now, I would be the last to claim that the generalized failure of structural
exchange rate models, as found in the post-Meese and Rogoff (1983) literature,
should not be taken seriously, even though there has been some progress in the
recent literature towards resolving these puzzles.
1
2 Rather, the apparent ability of
the Dornbusch model to describe the trajectory of the exchange rate after major
shifts in monetary policy is more than enough reason for us to press ahead and
look more deeply at its underlying theoretical structure. Regardless, of course,
Dornbusch's model was an important precursor to today's exchange rate literature.
The Model
At this point, it would be helpful to venture a bit more deeply into the inner work-
ings of the model. Doing so allows us to further explore its ideas and contribu-
tions. Readers who would like to finesse this technical material may skip to the
next section.
11Dornbusch (1976a), and Friedman (1953) writing before him, clearly anticipated that under floating
exchange rates, the monetary authorities would allow nominal interest rates to fluctuate in response to real
and financial market shocks far more than has actually turned out to be the case.
12See especially, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).
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We already have the first two equations of the model, equations (1) and (2)
above, the uncovered interest parity, and the money demand equations. The only
nuance is that since the Dornbusch model abstracts from uncertainty (except for
an initial one-time shock), one can replace the expected value of the rate of change
of the exchange rate Et (et+1 - et), with its actual value, et+1 - et, in equation (1). One of the central elements of Dornbusch's model, which I have skipped over
until now, is that it was among the first papers to introduce rational expectations
into international macroeconomics.
1
3 Imposing "rational expectations" here
implies that private agents must form exchange rate expectations in a way that is
consistent with the model itself. In this sense, rational expectations are a way of
imposing overall consistency on one's theoretical analysis. The idea has enormous
appeal but took some time to penetrate the economics profession, not least because
few economists were familiar with the now standard techniques needed to imple-
ment it. In fact, Dornbusch himself clearly learned the technique of rational expec-
tations over the course of his research on sticky-price exchange rate models. He had
already published a closely-related paper in the Journal of International Economics
(Dornbusch, 1976b), which contains the core of the overshooting model, but did not
incorporate rational expectations. The assumption of rational expectations made the
model far more intriguing. Policymakers found it sobering to learn that in a world
of fast-clearing asset markets and slow-clearing goods markets, exchange rate over-
shooting might be a rational response to monetary shocks.
Equation (3) below posits that aggregate demand depends on the real
exchange rate. Dornbusch (1976a) has a bit more complicated specification in
which the real interest rate also matters, but this nuance is unimportant for our
purposes. The main feature of the model is the Keynesian assumption that the
price of domestic goods cannot adjust immediately to clear the goods market. As
a consequence, aggregate demand y
d can temporarily deviate from its full-
employment level, y.
Aggregate demand
y? = y + d(et + p* -pt-q\ 5 > 0, (3)
t t t
Aggregate foreign equilibrium
demand price real exchange
level rate
where 5 > 0 and q is the equilibrium real exchange rate, which for simplicity we
will treat here as fixed. Thus, aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the
relative price of home-produced goods. In Dornbusch's main formulation, he
assumed that output y is exogenous, so that if aggregate demand exceeds supply,
the only impact will be on price adjustment. Here, we will adopt the variant
13Stanley Black's 1973 Princeton International Finance Discussion Paper appears to have been the
first international finance paper to incorporate rational expectations; it is cited in Dornbusch's article.
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Dornbusch presented in an appendix to his paper, in which output is endogenous
and demand determined. As the reader will readily deduce, it is not difficult to
move interchangeably between the two approaches.
The final element of Dornbusch's model is the price adjustment equation. That
prices must eventually adjust to a monetary shock may seem obvious to us today.
Dornbusch's treatment, however, was in stark contrast to the canonical Mundell-
Fleming model of his era, in which the domestic price level was typically assumed
fixed, and any dynamics depended on wealth accumulation.
1
4 Rather than use
Dornbusch's exact formulation, we will use a price adjustment mechanism
proposed by Mussa (1982), which has many virtues. It is better suited than
Dornbusch's original formulation to dealing with more complex exogenous





Sticky-price adjustment, a la Mussa
pt+l -pt = \|/<j?- y) + et+] - et,
Real exchange rate
where \|/ > 0. A key element of Mussa's formulation is that price adjustment has a
forward-looking element—embodied here in its response to expected future
exchange rate movements.
1
6 Note that equation (4) governs price movement only
after the initial unanticipated monetary shock. In the initial period, the price level
is tied down by its historical value and only the exchange rate is assumed free to
fluctuate.
To solve the model, it is helpful to reduce the above equations to a set of two
simultaneous difference equations. If we define the real exchange rate as:
q = e+p*-p9
and normalize the log of the fixed foreign price level p* to zero, then the price
adjustment equation (4) can be written as:
14In truth, neither the Dornbusch nor the Mundell-Fleming version of the Keynesian model had a
well-developed theory of how the economy should move from short-to long-run equilibrium, and this
important detail only came later in new open economy macroeconomics versions of the models.
15In fact, for the kinds of shocks Dornbusch (1976a) analyzed, the Mussa price adjustment equation
is observationally equivalent; see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984). Frankel (1979) offers an alternative way to
extend the Dornbusch model to allow for money growth shocks, though again it turns out to be observa-
tionally equivalent to the Mussa model.
16In general, the final term in the Mussa price adjustment mechanism has the level of inflation that
would be needed to clear the goods market if it were already in equilibrium. In the simple model I present
here, that rate of inflation just happens to equal the rate of exchange rate depreciation—see Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1984 or 1996, Chapter 9) for the general case.
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Real exchange rate adjustment
Aqt+1 = qt+1 -qt= -\|/5(qt - q). (5)
Note that equation (5) happens to be of the same form as the standard empirical
equation one sees estimated in the large literature aimed at calculating the speed
at which deviations from purchasing power parity die out.
1
7
The second equation of the dynamic system basically can be derived from the
money demand and uncovered interest parity equations, making use of the defini-
tion of the real exchange rate q. It is given by:
Nominal exchange rate adjustment
mt-et + qt = -r\(et+1 - et) + §h(qt -q) (6)
Equations (5) and (6) are graphed in Figure 4, which is drawn under the assumption
that (|)5 < 1. The vertical equation is the real exchange rate adjustment equation (5).
As readers familiar with this kind of model will immediately recognize, the basic
dynamic system of the Dornbusch model exhibits knife-edge "saddle-path" stability.
Because prices do not adjust immediately in response to shocks, the economy
is not necessarily at its long-run equilibrium, given by the intersection of the two
curves. But if it is not at this intersection, then it must lie on the SS line marked
by arrows, as any other starting point will lead down a path in which the exchange
rate either explodes or collapses, even if the money supply remains constant. The
microfoundations needed to justify why the economy must lie on the "saddle-
path" (the SS line) in monetary models were just beginning to be worked out at
the time Dornbusch's article was being written. (The first serious attempt is
Brock, 1975.) In 1977, Dornbusch could only assure us that all paths except those
on the dashed line "did not make sense." That answer, of course, was not entirely
satisfactory, and many of us remained fascinated by the possibility that the
economy could end up on a path characterized by a self-fulfilling nominal asset
price bubble. Numerous people worked for many years justifying this not-so-
minor assumption in the Dornbusch model (and related monetary models), using
both empirical methods (e.g., Flood and Garber, 1980) and theoretical reasoning
(e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983). The short answer, it seems, is that Rudi was




We are now ready to graphically demonstrate the overshooting result. Recall
that the mental exercise that Dornbusch considered was that of a one-time perma-
nent change in the money supply, which in the long run (imposing the saddle-path
assumption) must lead to a proportionate depreciation of both the price level and
the exchange rate. But in the short run, the price level is fixed, so what happens to
17See Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996).
18For a more detailed discussion, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Chapter 8.
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Figure 4. The Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch Model
Log nominal exchange rate, e
Aq = 0
m
(slope = 1 - (|)5)
Log real exchange
rate, q
the exchange rate? Well, when the exchange rate jumps in response to the initial
monetary surprise, q and e, the real exchange and the nominal exchange rate, have
to move in proportion. (This is more or less what happens in practice as well.)
Figure 5 illustrates the determination of an initial post-shock exchange rate, which
must lie at the intersection of the 45-degree line and the "saddle-path" line (the SS
line). As one can see, the exchange rate must overshoot its long-run equilibrium.
I have only presented a graphical depiction of overshooting, but it is not hard to
fill in the algebra. For a more formal derivation, I will leave it for the reader to look
at Dornbusch (1976a) or the exposition in Chapter 9 of my 1996 book with
Obstfeld, since it is not essential to our discussion here.
What has one achieved by filling in all these algebraic details? Is there anything
that was not already obvious by looking at equations (1) and (2)? First, because we
can actually solve the model formally, it is possible not only to talk about over-
shooting from a qualitative perspective, but from a quantitative perspective. One can
show what features of the model (e.g., very slow price adjustment) give rise to a high
level of overshooting, and therefore a high level of exchange rate volatility. Second,
one can now easily analyze a much richer menu of disturbances, such as anticipated
monetary shocks, though again I will leave it for the reader to look at other refer-
ences for details. Third, a formal analysis brings out subtle details such as the
assumption of no speculative asset price bubbles. Last, but not least, a complete
formulation of the model is necessary for empirical implementation.
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Figure 5. Overshooting in Response to a
Permanent Unanticipated Change in the Money Supply




I have already mentioned that overshooting does not have to happen in this
model, depending on the parameters. Figures 4 and 5 are drawn under the
assumption that (|)8< 1, which corresponds to the assumption that money demand
is not too responsive to output, and that aggregate demand does not move too
sharply in response to real exchange rate movements. If, on the other hand, (j)8 >
1 (i.e., if money demand is quite sensitive to output movement and aggregate
demand is quite sensitive to the real exchange rate), then the magic arrow-marked
"saddle-path" line becomes downward sloping as in Figure 6. Dornbusch consid-
ered this case to be quite unrealistic since most evidence suggests that monetary
policy significantly affects output only with a lag. Of course, as I have already
mentioned, the undershooting case does not seem quite as implausible in more
modern models in which money demand depends on consumption, which poten-
tially responds more quickly than output.
We can go further with the equations, but I think this is enough algebra to
illustrate the major points. I will not make any attempt to theoretically critique the
model; it is clearly dated in many ways. But what is interesting is how some of its
core ideas are sufficiently simple and powerful that they can be preserved in
today's richer and better-motivated frameworks.
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Figure 6. The Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch Model
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Competing Models of Overshooting
Dornbusch was not the first to advance the general notion of overshooting of
economic variables. Arguably, one can even find the idea in Alfred Marshall's
Principles of Economics (1890) in his analysis of short- versus long-run price elas-
ticities. The clearest early statement of the concept is found in Samuelson's 1948
Foundations of Economics where he discusses the application of Le Chatelier's
principle (from chemistry) to economics. Samuelson's discussion is largely
abstract, but he demonstrates general conditions under which, if some variables
adjust slowly, others may initially overreact.
At or around the time of Dornbusch's writing, Kouri (1976) and Calvo and
Rodriguez (1977) were proposing a very different notion of overshooting. The
dynamics in their models are more parallel to Mundell's than to Dornbusch's, in that
the slow-moving variable is national wealth, which adjusts only gradually over time
through the current account. Obstfeld and Stockman (1985) discuss these models in
their Handbook of International Economics chapter, and I will leave the reader to
look there for further details and references. The general reaction of policy
economists at the time was that these alternative models, while elegant, were far less
relevant empirically than Dornbusch's variant. The fundamental empirical criticism
was that they did not incorporate the essential ingredient of sticky prices. Certainly,
any model that predicts that nominal domestic price volatility is of the same order
of magnitude as exchange rate volatility patently contradicts the data. Also, the
somewhat ad hoc Kouri and Calvo-Rodriguez models came along just as the more
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elegant intertemporal approach to the current account was being developed (by
many scholars, but not least Obstfeld, Sachs, and Calvo himself), so they were also
quickly dated from a theoretical perspective, as well.
Nevertheless, the general point that current account dynamics can have large
medium-term impacts on real exchange rates remains an important one empiri-
cally. It is perhaps no less important than the connection between monetary expan-
sions and real exchange rates highlighted by the Dornbusch model. I sketch the
idea below, though I admit my discussion glosses over a number of important
details and assumptions that one can find in Frenkel and Razin (1987) or in
Chapter 4 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
During a period where a country is a large net importer of tradables, traded
goods will, ceteris paribus be relatively abundant, and the internal price of
nontradables will be high. When the trade balance turns to surplus and tradables
become relatively scarce, the real price of nontradables will drop. One often sees
this pattern in practice, particularly for countries that are forced to quickly reverse
current account balances. Figures 7a-d, show the correlation of real exchange rate
and current account imbalances in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico in the
1990s. One wants to be cautious in inferring a structural relationship based on
these casual correlations, which are driven by these countries' shifts in and out of
crises. I believe, however, that a closer look at the data would support the view that
the wealth channel was quite important in these instances. Figures 7e-g show the
same kind of relationship for the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom,
though in the case of the U.K., the correlation is quite weak.
Now it is possible, in principle, to integrate the two kinds of overshooting in a
unified model, along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Thus the two views
of overshooting can be viewed as complementary and not necessarily competing.
In the generalized model, the Dornbusch-type overshooting mechanism is the
primary factor driving the short-run results (though there need not be overshooting
depending on the model setup and parameters). The Kouri, Calvo-Rodriguez mech-
anism is central to the medium-run change in the real exchange rate. (Of course, the
two effects interact, but I leave this discussion for another day.)
III. Conclusion
Let me reiterate some of the lasting contributions of the Dornbusch model. First, it
breathed new life into the Mundell-Fleming model, which in turn remained a central
workhorse model for policy analysis for at least the next twenty to twenty-five years.
Second, Dornbusch (1976a) was the first paper in international finance to marry
sticky prices with rational expectations, both central features of today's mainstream
"post" Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. Third, the Dornbusch model defines a
high-water mark of theoretical simplicity and elegance in international finance, one
which inspired a generation of students, and which still stands today as fundamental.
Even today, the model in its original form remains relevant for policy analysis.
Dornbusch (1976a) is truly an extraordinary paper, one of the handful of most influ-
ential papers in macroeconomics generally over the past quarter century, and one of
the most important papers in international economics over the entire twentieth
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Figure 7b. Korea
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Figure 7c. Indonesia
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Figure 7d. Mexico
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Figure 7e. United States
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Figure 7f. Japan
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Figure 7g. United Kingdom
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